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Abstract
I introduce a model of scoring. An intermediary aggregates multiple features
of a sender into a score. A receiver sees this score and takes a decision. The
receiver wants his decision to match the sender’s latent characteristic. But
the sender wants the most favorable decision, and she can distort each of her
features at a private cost. I characterize the receiver-optimal scoring rule. This
rule underweights some features to deter sender distortion, and overweights
other features to keep the score unbiased. The receiver prefers this score to
seeing the sender’s full features because the coarser information mitigates his
commitment problem.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and results
Predictive scores are increasingly used to guide decisions. Banks use credit scores
to set the terms of loans; judges use defendant risk scores to set bail; and online
platforms score sellers, businesses, and job-seekers. We now live in a “scored society”
(Citron and Pasquale, 2014). These scores have a common structure: An intermedi-
ary gathers data about an agent from different sources and then converts the agents
features into a score that predicts some latent characteristic. For FICO credit scores,
which are used in the majority of consumer lending decisions in the United States,
the characteristic is creditworthiness, and the features include credit utilization rate
and credit mix.1
If, however, a strategic agent understands that she is being scored, she may distort
her features to improve her score, without changing her latent characteristic. For
example, a consumer can split her spending between two different credit cards to
lower her credit utilization rate, without reducing her risk of default. “The scoring
models may not be telling us the same thing that they have historically,” according
to Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s, “because people are so focused on their
scores and working hard to get them up.”2 As scores are introduced to guide high-
stakes decisions in new domains, people learn to manipulate them. In the presence
of such strategic behavior, what scoring rule induces the most accurate decisions?
To answer this question, I build a model of scoring. The agent being scored—
the sender—has multiple manipulable features. An intermediary commits to a rule
that maps the sender’s features into a score. A receiver sees this score and takes a
decision. The receiver wants his decision to match the senders latent characteristic.
The sender, however, wants the most favorable decision, and she can distort each
of her features at a cost. For each feature, the sender has two dimensions of private
information: her intrinsic level is the value of the feature if she does not distort it; her
distortion ability determines her cost of distorting her feature away from the intrinsic
level. The sender’s latent characteristic is correlated with her intrinsic level on each
feature.
The intermediary’s problem is to design the scoring rule to make the receiver’s
1FICO claims that its scores are used in 90% of U.S. lending decisions (https://ficoscore.com).
2“How More Americans Are Getting a Perfect Credit Score,” Bloomberg, August 14, 2017.
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decision most accurate. If the sender’s features were exogenous, this would be the
familiar statistical problem of predicting a latent parameter from observable covari-
ates. But the sender’s features are endogenous. The intermediary must consider how
the scoring rule motivates the sender to distort her features. Formally, each scoring
rule induces a different game between the sender and receiver.
To understand the interaction between the sender and receiver, I first drop the
intermediary and suppose that the receiver observes the sender’s features. Thus, the
sender and receiver play a signaling game, with the sender’s features as signals. This
signaling setting provides a lower bound on the intermediary’s payoff from optimal
scoring. Since the score set is not restricted, the intermediary can induce this signaling
game by using a scoring rule that fully discloses the sender’s features.
In the signaling game, the sender’s distortion interferes with the receiver’s in-
ference about the sender’s latent characteristic. I show that there is exactly one
equilibrium in linear strategies (Theorem 1). In this equilibrium, each of the sender’s
features confounds her intrinsic level with her distortion ability. The receiver loses
information not because of distortion itself, but because distortion is heterogeneous.
Indeed, in the special case of homogeneous distortion ability, the equilibrium is fully
separating. In that case, no information is lost, so the optimal scoring rule is full
disclosure.
Despite intuition from decision problems suggesting that more information pro-
duces better decisions, I show that aggregating the sender’s features into a score
transmits better information about the sender’s latent characteristic. The key in-
tuition is that, by limiting the receiver’s information, the intermediary provides the
receiver with partial commitment power. Without commitment, the receiver chooses
the decision that is optimal, taking the distribution of the sender’s features as given.
Commitment allows the receiver to internalize the effect of his strategy on the distri-
bution of the sender’s features.
The receiver freely chooses his decision after observing the intermediary’s score,
so the intermediary cannot give the receiver full commitment power. Nevertheless,
I show that for generic covariance parameters, the optimal scoring rule strictly out-
performs full disclosure (Theorem 2). As long as the features are not symmetric,
the intermediary improves information transmission by adjusting the relative weights
on different features. The optimal scoring rule underweights features on which the
sender’s distortion ability is most heterogeneous. It overweights other features to
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ensure that the score is not biased. If the receiver could observe the sender’s features
ex post, he would change his decision, but from the score alone he cannot disentangle
the contribution of each feature. Since the receiver has fewer feasible deviations, his
commitment problem is mitigated.
Finally I consider a screening setting in which the receiver commits to a decision
as a function of the sender’s features. Commitment power allows the receiver to
under-react to every feature. As commitment increases—from signaling to scoring
to screening—the receiver’s decision becomes less sensitive to the sender’s features
(Theorem 3). The receiver benefits from additional commitment, but the welfare
comparison for the sender is ambiguous. The receiver underweights features on which
distortion ability is most heterogeneous, but these are not necessarily the features on
which the sender’s distortion is most costly.
Outline Section 1.2 reviews related literature. Section 2 presents the model of scor-
ing. Section 3 analyzes the signaling setting without the intermediary. In Section 4, I
study the intermediary’s scoring problem. I characterize what decisions the interme-
diary can induce and then I optimize over this set. In Section 5, I introduce screening
and then I compare the three settings—signaling, scoring, and screening. Section 6
extends the baseline model to allow for stochastic scores and for a more general so-
cial welfare objective. The conclusion is in Section 7. Proofs are in Appendix A.
Additional results are in Appendix B.
1.2 Related literature
Mymodel combines signaling and information design: The sender adjusts her features
to signal her private type, and the intermediary designs the receiver’s information
about the sender’s features. In this section I relate my model to these two literatures.
In the main text, I connect my results to multi-dimensional cheap talk and to the
multitask principal–agent problem.
Signaling The foundation of my model is a signaling environment that is doubly
multi-dimensional. There are multiple signals, termed features, and for each signal
the sender has two dimensions of private information. Earlier papers have studied
these two forms of multi-dimensionality in isolation. In Frankel and Kartik (2019a),
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), and Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), the sender controls
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one signal, and her cost depends on two dimensions of private information. The signal
confounds these two dimensions, so there is no separating equilibrium. In Engers
(1987) and Quinzii and Rochet (1985), there are multiple signals, and for each signal,
the sender has a single-dimensional type. They give conditions under which a fully
separating equilibrium exists.
In my model, the intermediary’s scoring rule blends the sender’s features. Two
papers that study the effect of garbling costly signals. Rick (2013) gives conditions
under which transmitting signals over a noisy channel can improve social welfare.
Whitmeyer (2019) shows that in a binary signaling game, the receiver-optimal gar-
bling coincides with the receiver’s full commitment solution. These two papers focus
on a single signal transmitted over a noisy channel, whereas I study the optimal way
to aggregate different signals.3
I show that the three settings—signaling, scoring, and screening—generally yield
different decisions. Frankel and Kartik (2019b) compare signaling and screening in
their single-feature setting (Frankel and Kartik, 2019a). They show that a receiver
with commitment power benefits from under-reacting to the sender’s single feature.4
When there are multiple features, I show that even if the receiver cannot commit,
an informational intermediary can provide partial commitment power by aggregating
the sender’s features into a score.
The three settings that I compare give the same result in the canonical signaling
environment of Spence (1973) because the signaling equilibrium is fully separating.
But a classical literature compares these settings in the cheap-talk environment of
Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the partitional equilibria are not fully separating.
There, information transmission can be improved through mediation (Myerson, 1982;
Forges, 1986) or decision commitment (Holmstro¨m, 1977, 1984). I compare these
settings in a costly signaling environment that does not admit a fully separating
equilibrium.
Information design In the growing literature on information design (for surveys,
see Kamenica, 2019; Bergemann and Morris, 2019), the designer controls information
about an exogenous state. The designer’s policy influences the beliefs of a single
3Perez-Richet and Skreta (2018) study persuasion in a different setting in which the sender’s
distortion is costless but distortion rates are observable to the receiver.
4Computer scientists have studied a similar screening problem of strategic classification
(Meir et al., 2012; Dalvi et al., 2004; Hardt et al., 2016).
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agent (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) or multiple agents playing a simultaneous-
move game (Bergemann and Morris, 2013, 2016), but the information policy does
not change the distribution of the state that the designer observes. In my model,
the intermediary’s scoring rule changes the distribution of the sender’s features. This
feedback loop is crucial. The intermediary has the same preferences as the receiver,
so if the sender’s features were exogenous, full disclosure would be trivially optimal.
The few papers studying this feedback loop focus on moral hazard, without
private information. In Boleslavsky and Kim (2018), Rodina and Farragut (2016),
and Zapechelnyuk (2019), the designer must motivate the sender to exert effort
in addition to persuading the receiver. In a dynamic setting, Rodina (2016) and
Ho¨rner and Lambert (forthcoming) analyze information design in Holmstro¨m’s (1999)
career concerns model. Closer to my paper, Bonatti and Cisternas (forthcoming)
study the design of scores about a consumer who buys from a sequence of short-lived
monopolists. Ratings that overweight the past, relative to the Bayes-optimal weights,
deter consumers from strategically under-consuming. Our settings are different, but
we reach the common conclusion that ex post suboptimal weights maximize learning
from endogenous signals.
2 Model
There are three players. The agent being scored is called the sender (she). An
intermediary (it) commits to a rule that maps the senders features into a score. A
receiver (he) observes this score and takes a decision.
The receiver wants to predict the sender’s latent characteristic θ ∈ R. The receiver
takes a decision y ∈ R, and his utility uR is given by
uR = −(y − θ)
2.
Hence the receiver matches his decision with his posterior expectation of θ.
The sender has k manipulable features 1, . . . , k, where k > 1. For each feature i,
the sender has an intrinsic level ηi ∈ R, and she chooses distortion di ∈ R. Feature
i takes the value
xi = ηi + di.
For each feature i, the sender also has a distortion ability γi ∈ R+. Her utility uS is
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Sender
distortion d ∈ Rk
Receiver
decision y ∈ R
Intermediary
commits to
f : Rk → ∆(S)
(η, γ)
x = η + d f(x)
Figure 1. Flow of information
given by
uS = y − (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /γi.
The sender wants the decision y to be high, and she experiences a quadratic cost
from distorting each feature. Her marginal cost of distorting feature i decreases in
her distortion ability γi. At the other extreme, γi = 0, she cannot distort feature i,
so xi = ηi.
5
The sender chooses her distortion vector d = (d1, . . . , dk) after privately observing
her type, which consists of the vectors
η = (η1, . . . , ηk) and γ = (γ1, . . . , γk),
called her intrinsic type and distortion type. The sender does not observe her latent
characteristic θ, though her type (η, γ) may reveal it.
The random vector (θ, η, γ) has an elliptical distribution with finite second mo-
ments. The elliptical distribution generalizes the multivariate Gaussian. Elliptical
distributions are flexible enough to accommodate the sign restriction on γ, yet they
retain the property of the Gaussian that conditional expectations are linear. Sec-
tion 3.1 formally states this property and makes nondegeneracy assumptions on the
covariance. Section 3.4 makes substantive assumptions on the covariance.
Unlike the sender and receiver, the intermediary has commitment power. Before
5For γi = 0, the sender’s utility is defined by the limit as γi converges to 0 from above.
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observing the sender’s features, the intermediary commits to a score set S and a
scoring rule
f : Rk → ∆(S),
which assigns to each realized feature vector x a (stochastic) score f(x) in S. Here
∆(S) is the set of probability measures on S, but I use f(x) to denote the random
score itself.6 The score set S is not restricted. I will show, however, that there is no
loss in taking S equal to R.
The intermediary has the same utility function as the receiver, so the interme-
diary’s problem is to maximize the receiver’s information about the sender’s latent
characteristic. An interpretation is that the intermediary is a monopolist who sells a
scoring service to the receiver, but I do not explicitly model this.
The intermediary’s scoring rule induces a game between the sender and receiver.
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of information in this game. The sender observes her
private type (η, γ) and then chooses how much to distort each feature. Her distorted
feature vector x is realized and observed by the intermediary. The intermediary
assigns the score f(x) and passes it to the receiver. The receiver updates his beliefs
about the sender’s latent characteristic and takes a decision y. Finally, payoffs are
realized.
3 Signaling without the intermediary
I first drop the intermediary and suppose that the receiver observes the sender’s
features. Thus, the sender and receiver play a signaling game, with features as signals.
Figure 2 shows the flow of information in this game. This signaling setting gives a
lower bound on the intermediary’s payoff from optimal scoring. Since the score set
is unrestricted, the intermediary can replicate the signaling game by using a scoring
rule that fully discloses the sender’s features.
In this section, first I discuss the properties of elliptical distributions, and then I
use these properties to construct equilibria.
6If S is uncountable, measurability conditions are needed. I state them formally in Appendix B.8.
I will not comment further on measurability in the main text.
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Sender
distortion d ∈ Rk
Receiver
decision y ∈ R
(η, γ)
x = η + d
Figure 2. No intermediary
3.1 Elliptical distributions
The elliptical distribution generalizes the multivariate Gaussian. For a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and variance matrix Σ, each isodensity curve is an ellipse
centered at µ whose shape is determined by Σ. The density on each curve decays
exponentially in the square of the radius. Elliptical distributions have the same
isodensity curves, but the radial density function is unrestricted. In particular, if
the radial density function vanishes beyond a certain value, then the distribution
is supported inside some ellipsoid. One example is a uniform distribution on the
interior of an ellipsoid. Other examples are the Student distribution and the Laplace
distribution.7
Denote the mean and variance of (θ, η, γ) by
µ =


µθ
µη
µγ

 and Σ =


σ2θ Σθη Σθγ
Σηθ Σηη Σηγ
Σγθ Σγη Σγγ

 .
I do not specify the radial density function, as it will not play a role in my analysis. It
is implicitly restricted, however, by the assumption that γ is nonnegative. I make the
following standing nondegenaracy assumptions. Denote the Moore–Penrose inverse
of Σγγ by Σ
†
γγ . Assume that the matrix Σηη −ΣηγΣ
†
γγΣγη has full rank. This ensures
that the conditional variance of η given γ has full rank. Assume also that at least
one of the 2k components of (Σηθ,Σγθ) is nonzero. Thus, the sender’s type provides
some information about her latent characteristic.
Next I introduce notation for linear regression. Given a random variable Y and a
7These distributions have full support, but the mean and covariance parameters can be chosen
so that, with high probability, γ is nonnegative. If we truncate the distribution by setting the
density to zero whenever it is below a fixed tolerance, we get an elliptical distribution for which γ is
nonnegative.
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random p-vector X , the (population) regression problem is to choose an intercept b0
and a coefficient vector b in Rp to minimize the expected square error
E
[
(Y − b0 − b
TX)2
]
.
As long as X and Y are square integrable and var(X) has full rank, the minimizers
b⋆0 and b
⋆ are unique and given by
b⋆ = var−1(X) cov(X, Y ), b⋆0 = E[Y ]− (b
⋆)T E[X ].
I denote the p-vector of regression coefficients by
reg(Y |X) = var−1(X) cov(X, Y ).
This regression vector is a column vector, and I denote its transpose by regT (Y |X).
Next I state the key property of elliptical distributions.
Lemma 1 (Linear conditional expectations)
Let X = Aη +Bγ for some matrices A and B. If var(X) has full rank, then
E[θ|X ] = µθ + reg
T (θ|X)(X − E[X ]).
The right side is the regression of θ on the vector X , so it is the best linear
prediction of θ from X . The left side is the conditional expectation of θ given X , so
it is the best prediction of θ from X , without any linearity constraint. The elliptical
family is precisely the class of distributions for which this conditional expectation is
linear; for a formal statement of this characterization, see Appendix B.4.
Returning to the model, let β and β0 denote the coefficients from regressing θ on
η:
β = Σ−1ηη Σηθ, β0 = µθ − β
Tµη. (1)
By Lemma 1, we have E[θ|η] = β0 + β
Tη. These coefficients are useful benchmarks
against which to compare the linear equilibria constructed below.
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3.2 Linear equilibrium characterization
In the signaling game, (pure) strategies are defined as follows. Let T denote the
support of (η, γ). This set T is the sender’s type space. A distortion strategy for the
sender is a map
d : T → Rk,
which assigns a distortion vector to each sender type. A decision strategy for the
receiver is a map
y : Rk → R,
which assigns a decision to each feature vector of the sender.
I focus on Bayesian Nash equilibria in linear strategies, which I call linear equi-
libria.8 Restricting to linear equilibria disciplines the receiver’s off-path decisions. In
particular, linearity rules out discontinuous jumps in the receiver’s decisions off-path,
which are permitted, for example, by perfect Bayesian equilibrium.9
Suppose that the receiver uses the linear strategy
y(x) = b0 + b
Tx,
for some intercept b0 and some coefficient vector b = (b1, . . . , bk). Plugging this
strategy into the sender’s utility gives
b0 + b
T (η + d)− (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /γi.
Taking the receiver’s linear strategy as given, the sender’s utility is additively sepa-
rable in d1, . . . , dk. The marginal benefit of distorting feature i is the sensitivity bi of
the receiver’s decision to feature i. The marginal cost of distorting feature i is di/γi.
8Technically, these functions are affine, but I use the more common term linear throughout. To
be sure, nonlinear deviations are feasible, but in equilibrium they are not optimal.
9With Gaussian uncertainty, linear strategies have full support so nothing is off-path. To avoid
negative cost functions, I follow Frankel and Kartik (2019a) in using elliptical distributions with
compact support. One consequence is that linear strategies do not have full support. With this
modeling choice, imposing weak Bayesian equilibrium means that some type knows she is the lowest
type and hence would never choose costly distortion. This low probability event makes belief-
updating intractable.
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Equating these expressions gives
di(η, γ) = biγi.
On each feature i, the sender’s best response is increasing in her distortion ability and
in the sensitivity of the receiver’s decision to feature i. Because the receiver uses a
linear strategy, the return to distortion is constant. Therefore, the sender’s distortion
best response does not depend on her intrinsic level. Denoting the componentwise
(Hadamard) product of vectors with with the symbol ◦, the full best response is
d(η, γ) = b ◦ γ.
The sender’s best response induces the feature vector η + b ◦ γ. The equilibrium
condition is
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ) = E[θ|η + b ◦ γ]. (2)
The left side is the receiver’s linear strategy, evaluated at the feature vector η+ b ◦ γ.
The right side is the receiver’s posterior expectation of θ upon seeing the sender’s
feature vector. This equality between random variables must hold almost surely. By
the linear conditional expectation property (Lemma 1), the conditional expectation
on the right side equals the population regression of θ on the random feature vector
η + b ◦ γ. Therefore, this equality holds if and only if these regression coefficients
coincide with the corresponding coefficients on the left side.10
Taking expectations of each side of (2) gives
b0 + b
T (µη + b ◦ µγ) = µθ.
The intercept b0 is pinned down by the vector b. Hereafter I refer to linear equilibria
by the coefficient vector b alone, with the understanding that b0 is chosen to satisfy
this equation. The equilibrium condition for the vector b is
b = reg(θ|η + b ◦ γ),
10The only if direction holds because, for all vectors b, the variance of η + b ◦ γ has full rank.
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which can be expressed equivalently in terms of the covariance as
var(η + b ◦ γ)b = cov(η + b ◦ γ, θ). (3)
Both sides of these equation are k-vectors. This is a system of k equations in the
k unknowns b1, . . . , bk. Each equation involves cubic polynomials, with coefficients
determined by the covariance matrix Σ.11
The cubic degree of this system highlights the challenge of analyzing this sequential-
move game. In a simultaneous-move game with quadratic utility functions, best re-
sponses are linear and the coefficients of a linear equilibrium are characterized by a
linear system (Morris and Shin, 2002; Lambert and Ostrovsky, 2018). In my model,
the receiver makes an inference from the sender’s endogenous features, not an ex-
ogenous signal. The feedback from the receiver’s strategy to the distribution of this
signal increases the dimension of the equilibrium conditions.
3.3 Homogeneous distortion
I first analyze the special case in which the distortion vector γ is nonrandom, that is,
γ = µγ.Therefore, the sender’s private information is only her intrinsic type η.
Proposition 1 (Separating equilibrium)
If the distortion vector γ is nonrandom, then the signaling game has exactly one linear
equilibrium. This equilibrium is fully separating.
This proposition follows directly from the linear equilibrium condition (3). With
γ nonrandom, (3) reduces to the linear system
var(η)b = cov(η, θ).
In terms of the regression coefficients β0, . . . , βk defined in (1), it follows that
b = β, b0 = β0 − β
T (β ◦ µγ).
11Let diag(b) denote the diagonal matrix with the vector b along the diagonal. After rewriting the
Hadamard product b ◦ γ as diag(b)γ, the full equation becomes[
Σηη +Σηγ diag(b) + diag(b)Σγη + diag(b)Σγγ diag(b)
]
b = Σηθ + b ◦ Σγθ.
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The receiver uses the same coefficient vector on the sender’s features as he would if
could directly observe the sender’s intrinsic level. The sender chooses the distortion
vector β◦µγ , so the receiver subtracts this from the feature vector, and no information
is lost. The receiver’s decision coincides with the conditional expectation E[θ|η], which
in this case equals E[θ|η, γ].
With the intrinsic level as the only private information, the signaling equilibrium
perfectly reveals the sender’s intrinsic levels to the receiver, so there is no role for
the intermediary. Returning to the FICO credit scoring example, if every consumer
distorts her features by the same amount, this could be easily corrected by subtracting
a constant from everyone’s credit score. But in reality, different consumers experience
different costs and benefits form distortion. I turn to this general case next.
3.4 Equilibrium existence and uniqueness
With the distortion vector γ nonconstant, the equilibrium condition (3) is cubic,
not linear. Specifically, the linear equilibria are characterized by a cubic polynomial
system of k equations in k unknowns. Generically, such a system has at most 3k real
solutions, but in general these systems are difficult to analyze.12 Instead of analyzing
this system algebraically, I take an analytic approach.
Unless specified otherwise, I make the following covariance assumptions for the
rest of the paper.
Assumptions (Covariance)
A. γ and (θ, η) are uncorrelated.13
B. cov(γi, γj) ≥ 0 for all features i, j.
Assumption A says that the distortion ability is not informative about the char-
acteristic of interest or the intrinsic levels. This stylized assumption substantially
simplifies the analysis because all the cross covariance terms vanish. But the quali-
tative conclusions go through more generally; see Section 6.5.
12For a system of k polynomial equations in k unknowns with generic coefficients, there are finitely
many complex solutions. Whenever there are finitely many complex solutions, the Bezout’s theorem
states that the number of complex solutions is at most the product of the degrees of the equations
(Cox et al., 2005, Theorem 5.5, p. 115) Of course, every real solution is a complex solution, so if
there are finitely many linear equilibria, then there are at most 3k equilibria. This upper bound is
achieved if each equation is a univariate cubic polynomial in a single variable with three real roots.
13Two random variables W and Z are uncorrelated if E[WZT ] = E[W ]E[Z]T , or equivalently,
the componentwise covariances cov(Wi, Zj) are zero for all i and j.
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Assumption B says that the sender’s distortion ability on different features is
nonnegatively correlated. In the sender’s utility function, the distortion ability γi
parameterize the sender’s cost of distortion. Through a change of variables, this
ability can also be interpreted as measuring the intensity of the sender’s preferences
for a high decision. Suppose that
uR = γ0y − (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /γ¯i,
where each γ¯i is a fixed constant and γ0 is a nonnegative random variable. Dividing
by γ0 does not change the receiver’s preferences, and yields a utility function that fits
the baseline model with γi = γ0γ¯i. Immediately,
cov(γi, γj) = var(γ0)γ¯iγ¯j ≥ 0,
so Assumption B is automatically satisfied. More generally, the distortion ability can
reflect heterogeneity in the sender’s cost of distortion and the sender’s preference for
high decisions.
With these standing assumptions, I obtain the main result for the signaling game.
Theorem 1 (Existence and uniqueness)
The signaling game has exactly one linear equilibrium.
For existence, I use only the nondeneracy assumption on the conditional variance
var(η|γ). Assumptions A and B are not required. Define the best-response function
BR: Rk → Rk by
BR(b) = reg(θ|η + b ◦ γ).
This function is continuous, but the strategy sets are not bounded. To apply a fixed-
point theorem, I show that the function BR has bounded image. The key observation
is that for every b, the variance matrix var(η+ b◦ γ) is uniformly bounded away from
0 in the positive semidefinite matrix order.14 This gives a uniform upper bound on
the receiver’s best response vector because the variance of the receiver’s best response
cannot be too large. With this bound, I apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
14For two symmetric matrices A and B, we have A  B if and only if the difference A − B is
positive semidefinite.
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Uniqueness is more subtle. In the single-dimensional case, the linear equilibria
are the roots of a univariate cubic polynomial. In general, there can be up three real
roots, and without the covariance assumptions there can indeed by three equilibria.
With k features, the equilibrium system can in general have 3k roots. But under
the covariance assumptions, the equilibrium is unique. The idea is to express the
equilibrium condition as a stationary point of a strictly convex function Φ. Define
the function Φ by
Φ(z) = var(zT η − θ) + (1/2) var((z ◦ z)Tγ).
There is an equilibrium at b if and only if ∇Φ(b) = 0. The convexity of this function
expresses a simple property. Consider a candidate equilibrium strategy profile (b, b).
As b moves away from b⋆ in either direction, the receiver gets an increasing marginal
benefit from adjusting his strategy in the direction of the equilibrium profile b⋆. I
illustrate this function in the following single-feature example.
Example 1 (Single feature). Suppose k = 1. Now η, γ, and b are scalars instead
of vectors. If the receiver uses a linear decision strategy with slope b, the receiver’s
distortion best response is d(η, γ) = bγ. The sender’s feature equals η + bγ, so
BR(b) =
σθη
σ2η + b
2σ2γ
.
I denote this term by BR(b). For simplicity suppose θ = η and all variances equal
1. Then BR(b) = 1/(1 + b2). Figure 3 plots this best-response function against the
45-degree line. The best response achieves its maximum of 1 at b = 0. As b increases,
the magnitude of the sender’s distortion increases, so the sender’s features become
a noisier signal of her intrinsic level, and thus the receiver’s best response is less
sensitive to the sender’s feature. Equilibrium is given by the condition b = BR(b).
There is exactly one equilibrium, namely the unique root of the cubic polynomial
b3 + b− 1. Thus, b⋆ ≈ 0.68.
How could this equilibrium arise? The intuition is that the receiver chooses some
linear scoring rule. Then the sender adjusts her strategy in response, the receiver
adjusts his strategy in response, and so on. As long as one player is playing a linear
strategy, the best response of the other agent is also linear. In Appendix B.2, I show
that continuous best-response dynamics converge to the unique signaling equilibrium.
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Figure 3. Equilibrium and convex representation
3.5 Information loss from distortion
Now I study the comparative statics as the sender cares more about the receiver’s
decision. Suppose that the receiver’s utility equals
sy − (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /γi,
where s > 0. The parameter s controls the weight that the sender attaches to the
receiver’s decision. Without changing the sender’s preferences, we can divide by s to
get
y − (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /(sγi).
This is the utility function from the baseline model, except that the sender’s distortion
type is sγ. In the variance matrix Σ, the submatrix Σγγ is scaled up by s
2 and all
other components are unchanged. By Assumption A, the covariances between γ and
(θ, η) are already zero, so they do not change. Therefore, these comparative statics
can be captured equivalently by scaling up the variance matrix Σγγ by s
2. I study
how this stakes parameter s affects the receiver’s equilibrium utility—her utility in
the unique linear equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Information loss)
Fix a positive definite matrix Σ¯γγ, and let Σγγ(s) = s
2Σ¯γγ for s > 0. The receiver’s
equilibrium utility is strictly decreasing in s.
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As s increases, the sender’s equilibrium feature vector becomes less informative
about the sender’s latent characteristic θ. For a given decision strategy of the receiver,
it is clear that as s increases, the sender distorts her features by more and hence
they become less informative. But the receiver’s equilibrium strategy also changes
as s changes., so this conclusion is more subtle. A natural conjecture is that the
equilibrium utility decreases whenever the variance matrix Σγγ strictly increases in
the positive semidefinite cone order, but this does not hold, as illustrated by the
following counterexample.
Example 2 (Equilibrium payoff not monotone in Σγγ). Suppose k = 2. Consider
the covariance matrices
Σθη =
[
4
1
]
, Σηη =
[
2 1
1 2
]
, Σγγ =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
Set σ2θ = 9. This variance does not affect the analysis, as long as the induced variance
matrix is positive semidefinite. With these parameters, the regression coefficient β
equals (7/3,−2/3). Even though η1 and η2 are both positively correlated with the
characteristic θ, the component η1 is much more strongly correlated, so the regression
coefficient on η2 is negative. The signaling equilibrium is b
⋆ = (1.20,−0.10). As
var(γ2) increases, both components of b
⋆ shrink in magnitude, and the receiver’s
payoff increases, though the effect is very small.15
This result extends the single-dimensional result in Frankel and Kartik (2019a).
With a single feature, the scaling and the positive semidefinite cone order coincide.
In multiple dimensions this is no longer the case, and my result clarifies that it is
scaling the objective, not just increasing the variance matrix, that reduces equilibrium
information transmission.
4 Scoring
Now I return to the main model with the intermediary. To simplify the intermediary’s
problem, I first establish a revelation principle: There is no loss in restricting to direct
recommendation scores. With this result, I characterize the linear outcome rules that
15Increasing var(γ2) from 1 to 2 shifts b
⋆ from (1.1951,−0.0971) to (1.1950,−0.0966). The re-
ceiver’s utility increases from −4.3167 to −4.3165.
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the intermediary can induce. Then I maximize the intermediary’s objective over this
set.
4.1 Revelation principle and obedience
Each scoring rule f : Rk → ∆(S) induces a different game between the sender and the
receiver. In order to state the revelation principle in full generality, I allow for mixed
strategies in this game. A distortion strategy for the sender is a map d : T → ∆(Rk).
A decision strategy for the receiver is a map y : S → ∆(R), which assigns to each score
a distribution over decisions. The solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium, just
as in the signaling setting without the intermediary. But the revelation principle
would hold for other solution concepts as well.
Together a scoring rule f and a strategy profile (d, y) in the resulting game induce
an outcome rule σ = (σS, σR), with σS = d and σR = y ◦ f , where the composition
of functions is extended in the natural way to the composition of mixed strategies.
An outcome rule σ is implementable if there exists a scoring rule f and a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (d, y) in the associated game that induces σ. An outcome rule is
directly implementable if it can be implemented by a scoring rule with S = R and
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with y = id. In words, direct implementation means
that the intermediary makes a decision recommendation, and the receiver follows this
recommendation.
Proposition 3 (Revelation principle)
Every implementable outcome rule is directly implementable.
The intuition is that the intermediary pools all the scores inducing the same
decision into a single score, which is then renamed to be the decision that it induces.
This way, the intermediary gives the receiver the minimal information needed to
take his decision. The intuition resembles the revelation principle from Myerson
(1986), but the formal details are different because the intermediary in my model
observes the sender’s features (which are payoff-relevant actions) rather than cheap-
talk messages.16
16With cheap-talk messages, the mediator can without loss restrict the sender to a fixed set of
messages. The mediator distinguishes one default message from the message set and commits to
treat any message outside the message space as if the sender had sent that default message. By
sending a message outside the message space, the sender cannot do better than sending the default
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With the revelation principle, I can focus my analysis directly on the outcome rule
σ. A decision rule σ is directly implementable if it satisfies the following obedience
conditions. The sender’s obedience condition is simply her equilibrium condition for
strategy profile (σS, σR). For the receiver, the obedience condition is
σR(η + σS(η, γ)) = E
[
θ|σR(η + σR(η, γ))
]
.
Here, both sides are viewed as random variables. The randomness comes from the
random variable (θ, η, γ) and also from the mixed decision rules.
4.2 Linear outcome rules
For the rest of the analysis, I restrict to linear decision rules. This allows me to isolate
the effect of commitment when I compare with the signaling setting. Thus,
σR(x) = b0 + b
Tx,
for some intercept b0 ∈ R and a coefficient vector b ∈ R
k. As in the signaling game,
the sender’s best response is σS(η, γ) = b ◦ γ. The receiver’s obedience condition,
however, is much more permissive than the receiver’s best response condition in the
signaling game. The receiver’s decision must match his conditional expectation of θ,
given the intermediary’s decision recommendation:
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ) = E[θ|b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ)]. (4)
By the linear conditional expectations property (Lemma 1), this reduces to the re-
gression system. The intercept b0 on the right side does not affect the conditional
expectation, so b0 is pinned down by b:
b0 = µθ − b
T (µη + b ◦ µγ).
message. The same approach does not work in my model because different distortion vectors give
the sender different payoffs, even if they result in the same decision by the receiver. Doval and Ely
(2016) and Makris and Renou (2018) establish a revelation principle for dynamic games in which
the designer can observe past actions.
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The coefficient vector b must satisfy a single regression equation:
1 = reg
(
θ|bT (η + b ◦ γ)
)
.
or in terms of the covariance as
var
(
bT (η + b ◦ γ)
)
= cov
(
bT (η + b ◦ γ), θ
)
. (5)
This condition says that if the receiver regresses θ on the score, the regression
coefficient is 1. This is of course a necessary condition; otherwise the receiver would
have a profitable linear deviation. By the linear conditional expectations property
(Lemma 1), the receiver’s best response is linear, so if he has no profitable linear
deviation, he has no profitable deviation at all.
This is a single quartic polynomial equation in the coefficients b1, . . . , bk. Compare
this scalar equality with the vector equality from the signaling equilibrium
var(η + b ◦ γ)b = bT cov((η + b ◦ γ), θ).
If b satisfies the equilibrium condition, then it automatically satisfies the scoring con-
dition. As long as there are multiple features (k > 2), then the scoring condition is
more permissive. If there is a single feature (k = 1), then the signaling and scoring
conditions are the same, except that scoring always permits b = 0. In essence, the in-
termediary can always provide no information about the sender’s features, the receiver
will just match his decision with his prior expectation µθ. Thus, multiple features are
crucial, and this is what distinguishes my setting from the single-dimensional setting
of Frankel and Kartik (2019a,b).
Figure 4 plots the level curves in feature space of the intermediary’s scoring rule.
For illustration, I take k = 2. The contour lines are equally spaced parallel lines,
orthogonal to the coefficient vector b. In general for k > 3, the level sets are parallel
hyperplanes orthogonal to the vector b. Upon seeing the intermediary’s score, the
receiver learns which level set the sender’s feature lies in, but he cannot pinpoint the
sender’s exact feature vector. Based on this information, the receiver updates his
belief about the sender’s characteristic and takes a decision.
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Figure 4. Level curves of scoring function
4.3 A simple setting
Consider the following simple setting, which I refer to throughout the rest of the
paper. The characteristic θ has mean zero and unit variance. For each i,
ηi = θ + εi,
and θ, ε1, . . . , εi, γ1, . . . , γk are uncorrelated. Denote the variances by σ
2
ε,i = var(εi)
and σ2γ,i = var(γi) for each i.
Figure 5 plots the set of obedience decision rules for k = 2, with σ2ε,1 = σ
2
ε,2 = 1
and σ2γ,1 = 1.5. The solid blue curve shows σ
2
γ,2 = 1.5 and the dashed orange curve
shows σ2γ,2 = 1.5. If the intermediary recommends a decision using a rule strictly in-
side this curve, the receiver’s best response is linear in the recommendation but with
a coefficient strictly greater than 1.17 Conversely, if the intermediary recommends a
decision using a rule strictly outside the curve, then the receiver’s best response is
linear in the recommendation, but with a coefficient strictly less than 1 (and possibly
negative). As the variance of the distortion ability γ2 increases, the obedience con-
straint requires that for a given value of b1, the coefficient b2 shrinks towards 0. Both
curves pass through the origin, which corresponds to the intermediary providing no
17To see that these regions are nested, observe that the region inside the curve is given by the
inequality
bTΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b) ≤ b
TΣηθ.
As Σγγ decreases with respect to the positive semidefinite order, this inequality becomes more
permissive.
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Figure 5. Obedient coefficient vectors for two different parameter values
information to the receiver.
4.4 Optimal scoring
Having characterized the set of feasible decision rules, I now optimize over this set
with respect to the intermediary’s objective. The scoring rules are parameterized
by the coefficients b0 and b, but the intercept b0 is pinned down by b, so the set of
obedient decision rules is parameterized by b alone. The intermediary minimizes her
expected loss
E
[(
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
)2]
.
The standard bias–variance decomposition gives
E2
[
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
]
+ var
(
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
)
.
For obedient decision rules, the first term vanishes. In the second term, b0 does not
affec the variance so it can be dropped, leaving an optimization over coefficient vectors
b in Rk. The intermediary’s problem is
minimize var
(
bT (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
)
subject to var
(
bT (η + b ◦ γ)
)
= cov
(
bT (η + b ◦ γ), θ
)
.
(6)
The objective is convex, but the feasible set is not, so this is not a convex opti-
mization problem.
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βbsignal = bscore
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Figure 6. Optimal scoring rule and signaling equilibrium
Proposition 4 (Scoring uniqueness)
The scoring problem has a unique solution.
This allows for an unambiguous comparison between the signaling equilibrium
vector, which I denote by bsignal, and the scoring equilibrium, denoted bscore.
Theorem 2 (Scoring and signaling)
For almost every value of (Σηθ,Σηη,Σγγ), we have bsignal 6= bscore.
Figure 6 compares the signaling equilibrium and the scoring solution for the ex-
ample shown in Figure 5, with the same parameter choices as before—the solid blue
curve is (σ2γ,1, σ
2
γ,2) = (1.5, 1.5) and the dashed blue curve is (σ
2
g,1, σ
2
γ,2) = (1.5, 6). In
the symmetric case, the signaling equilibrium vector is a scalar multiple of the re-
gression coefficient β. In this case, the signaling equilibrium maximizes the receiver’s
utility over all obedient decisions rules, so the scoring solution coincides with the
signaling equilibrium.
The orange curve illustrates the generic case. Here σ2γ,1 > σ
2
γ,2, so in the signaling
equilibrium the receiver’s decision is less sensitive to feature 1 than to feature 2.
In this case, the signaling equilibrium does not maximize the receiver’s utility over
all obedient decision rules, and the intermediary can improve the accuracy of the
receiver’s decision by sliding further away from the 45-degree line, in order to put
more weight on feature 1 and less weight on feature 2. In general, there will be a
local improvement away from the signaling equilibrium, along the curve of obedient
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decision rules, as long as the gradient of the receiver’s objective is orthogonal to the
curve.
I now present this perturbation argument more generally for arbitrary k. Start at
the signaling equilibrium vector, which I denote here by b⋆ to simplify the notation.
Write the receiver’s utility as a function of both the sender’s strategy and the receiver’s
strategy:
UR(a, b) = − var
(
bT (η + a ◦ γ)− θ
)
.
When perturbing the vector b away from the signaling equilibrium profile in the
direction v, the first-order effect is
∇1UR(b
⋆, b⋆) · v +∇2UR(b
⋆, b⋆) · v.
But in equilibrium, the receiver is playing a best response, so the first-order condition
implies that ∇2UR(b
⋆, b⋆) = 0. Therefore, the first-order effect of a local change is
only on the sender’s feature vector. Writing out the variance, we get
∇1UR(b
⋆, b⋆) = −2 diag(b⋆)Σγγ(b
⋆ ◦ b⋆),
so
∇1UR(b
⋆, b⋆) · v = −(b⋆)T diag(b⋆)Σγγ diag(b
⋆)v.
Therefore there is a local improvement in moving away from the more heteroge-
neous features. Of course, this direction must remain within the manifold of obedient
coefficient vectors. The receiver cannot systematically shrink the coefficient vector
because doing so would violate the obedience constraint. But as long as the features
are not symmetric, there is a direction that preserves the obedience constraint and
local improves the receiver’s information.
Proposition 5 (Asymmetry condition)
If bsignal is not a scalar multiple of β, then bsignal 6= bscore.
Unlike signaling, the comparative statics result is stronger. A function g is in-
creasing with respect to a partial order if x  y implies f(x) ≥ f(y) and x ≻ y
implies f(x) > f(y). Note, however, that the relations A  B and A 6= B do not
imply A ≻ B.
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Figure 7. Ex post best response to scoring
Proposition 6 (Scoring comparative statics)
The receiver’s scoring utility is decreasing in the variance Σγγ .
As the variance Σγγ increases, so does the variance of the decision, which strictly
slackens the constraint. This result is stronger than the comparative statics in the
signaling case. In fact, the proof shows that the receiver’s payoff is decreasing with
respect to the even weaker copositive matrix order.
5 Comparing commitments
The intermediary partially resolves the receiver’s commitment problem. Now I con-
sider a screening setting, in which the receiver commits to a decision as a function of
the sender’s features. In this section, I compare the three settings—signaling, scoring,
and screening.
5.1 Decision commitment
The final commitment regime is full commitment for the receiver, termed screening.
The intermediary and the receiver have the same preferences, so the intermediary can
fully reveal the sender’s features to receiver and let the receiver commit to a decision
rule. Alternatively, the intermediary can make a decision recommendation, without
any obedience constraints on the receiver. To isolate the effect of commitment, I
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again restrict to linear decision rules. The problem is to minimize the expected loss
E
[(
b0 + b
T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
)2]
.
This objective incorporates the sender’s best response to this decision rule. Without
the obedience constraint, it is feasible to commit to a decision rule that is system-
atically biased, but this is never optimal. Adjusting the intercept b0 does not affect
the sender’s incentives, so it is always optimal to choose b0 so that the expected
decision equals the expected characteristic. Applying the same bias–variance decom-
position used above in the intermediary’s problem, it follows that the receiver faces
an unconstrained optimization of coefficient vectors b in Rk, with loss function
var
(
bTη + (b ◦ b)Tγ − θ
)
= var(bTη − θ) + (b ◦ b)TΣγγ(b ◦ b).
This is the third and final commitment regime. Here it is immediately clear that the
receiver’s payoff is decreasing in Σγγ , with respect to the positive semidefinite order.
The objective is the same in all three cases. Without the intermediary, the signaling
equilibrium is pinned down by the system of k equations in (3). By Theorem 1,
there is exactly one coefficient vector satisfying these conditions, so the objective
function plays no role. Next, with the intermediary, scoring imposes a single obedience
condition (5), so the feasible set is a (k− 1)-dimensional hypersurface in Rk. Finally,
under screening, there are no constraints, so the optimization is over all of Rk.
5.2 Commitment reduces distortion
Now I can formally quantify the loss from distortion. The receiver’s loss separates
and can be written as
var(bT η − θ) + var
(
(b ◦ b)Tγ) = var(bTη − θ) + (b ◦ b)TΣγγ(b ◦ b).
The second term reflects the uncertainty created by the sender’s distortion. Define
the norm ‖ · ‖4,γ by
‖b‖4,γ =
[
(b ◦ b)TΣγγ(b ◦ b)
]1/4
.
See Appendix B.7 for the proof this is in fact a norm. This norm measures the
sensitivity of the receiver’s decisions to the sender’s features. It is with respect to
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Figure 8. Comparing commitments
this measure of sensitivity that the receiver’s decision becomes less sensitive to the
sender’s features as commitment increases.
Theorem 3 (Commitment reduces distortion)
If Σγγ is positive definite, then
‖β‖4,γ > ‖bsignal‖4,γ ≥ ‖bscore‖4,γ > ‖bscreen‖4,γ.
As the receiver’s commitment power increases, the receiver makes his decision less
sensitive to the sender’s features into order to reduce the sender’s distortion.
5.3 Comparing feature weights
I compare all three commitment regimes in the simple setting of Section 4.3. The
parameter σ2γ,1 is fixed at 1.5, and I vary σ
2
γ,2. Figure 8 plots the features weights as
σ2γ,2 varies from 1.5 to 6.
First, look at the left axis, where σ2γ,1 = σ
2
γ,2 = 1.5. Here the signaling equilibrium
and the scoring solution coincide, as was plotted in Figure 6. The screening solution,
however, puts strictly smaller weights on both features. This highlights the fact that
scoring allows the intermediary to rearrange the weights on the different features,
but it does not allow the intermediary to systematically decrease the weight on every
feature. When the features are symmetric, nothing can be gained from re-weighting,
but commitment strictly increases the receiver’s payoff.
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Moving to the right, the variance σ2γ,2 increases, meaning that distortion ability
on the second feature becomes more heterogeneous. For all three regimes, the weight
placed on the second feature decreases. If the components were uncorrelated, this
would have no effect on the first feature, but because η1 and η2 are positively corre-
lated, the weight on the first feature also increases. Relative to the signaling equilib-
rium, the scoring solution has even less equal weights on the two features because the
intermediary, unlike the receiver’s equilibrium strategy, internalizes the effect of the
greater decision sensitivity on the sender’s choice of distortion. The scoring solution
is not a signaling equilibrium. If, ex post, the receiver could observe the features, he
would want to use different weights, as illustrated in Figure 7.
The observations in this example generalize to the simple setting introduced in
Section 4.3.
Proposition 7 (Feature weights)
In the simple setting, the following hold.
(i) bsignal, bscore, and bscreen are all nonnegative.
(ii) bscore ≤ bscreen.
(iii) If (σ2ε,i, σ
2
γ,i) > (σ
2
ε,j, σ
2
γ,j), then bi < bj for all b in {bsignal, bscore, bscreen}.
First, I compare the features weights across commitment levels. Relative to scor-
ing, the screening solution puts less weight on every feature. Next I compare the
weights on different features within the same commitment setting. Less weight is a
placed on a feature if the intrinsic level is a noisier signal of the latent characteristic
and the distortion ability is more heterogeneous.
6 Extensions
6.1 Random scoring
Suppose that the intermediary can use stochastic scoring rules In the main model, I
restrict to deterministic linear scores. Now I allow for stochastic scores. Now I impose
the linearity restriction on the conditional expectation. There exists b0 in R and b in
Rk such that, for all x ∈ Rk,
E[σR(x)] = b0 + b
Tx
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Scoring is noise-free if σR(x) = E[σR(x)] for all x.
Proposition 8 (Noise-free scoring)
Optimal scoring is noise-free
In general, this result relies on the fact that Σγθ ≥ 0. Next I provide a single-
feature example, violating Assumption A in which noisy scoring is optimal.
Example 3 (Noisy scoring). Take k = 1. Suppose η and γ are uncorrelated with
unit variance and θ = η−2γ. In this case the optimal scoring rules uses b = 0.25 and
t2 = 0.059. The noise dampens b in order order to reduce the information loss from
distortion.
6.2 Efficient scoring
In the main model, the intermediary maximizes the receiver’s utility uR. More gen-
erally, suppose that the intermediary maximizes the expectation of the social welfare
function
piuS + (1− pi)uR,
where pi in [0, 1] is the Pareto weight on the sender. If pi = 0, this reduces to the
baseline model. If pi = 1, then the solution is to provide no information. The sender
is risk-neutral and the scoring policy cannot change the receiver’s expected decision.
Therefore, the scoring policy affects the sender only through her cost of distortion
(1/2)
k∑
i=1
(biγi)
2/γi = (1/2)(b ◦ b)
Tγ.
For a linear decision rule, the intermediary minimizes
pi(1/2)(b ◦ b)Tµγ + (1− pi)
[
var(bTη − θ) + (b ◦ b)TΣγγ(b ◦ b)
]
.
The noisiness can be captured by the noise ratio
E[var(f(X)|X)]
var(f(X))
.
The denominator is the variance of the score. The numerator is the expected variance
of the noise that is added to the score.
30
Proposition 9 (Efficient scoring)
There exists a cutoff p¯i ∈ [0, 1) such that optimal scoring is noise-free if and only if
pi ≤ p¯i. The noise ratio is strictly increasing in pi for pi > p¯i.
6.3 Productive distortion
In my model distortion takes a particularly simple form, additively adjusting each
feature. But distortion represents some activity that may affect multiple features si-
multaneously, but in the baseline model I have already performed a convenient change
of basis. The substantive assumption is that the feature vector depends linearly on
the natural vector η and distortion vector d. Suppose instead that the realized feature
vector x is given by
x = x0 + Aη +Bd,
where x0 is a k-vector and A and B are full rank k× k matrices. This setting can be
reduced to redefining the feature vector to be B−1x, which contains exactly the same
information as the original feature vector x. Since
B−1x = B−1(x0 + Aη) + d,
this new feature vector takes the assumed form with natural vector B−1(x0 + Aη).
Because B has full rank, this transformation preserves Assumptions A and B.
6.4 Observable features
In the main model, the receiver observes sender’s score, but he does not directly
observe any of the sender’s features. What if instead the receiver can observe some
of the sender’s features?
Suppose a subset of features is observable. Partition the index set as
{1, . . . , k} = I ∪ J,
where features i in I are directly observable, but features j in J are not. Therefore,
the decision rule is parameterized by (b0, b) = (b0, bI , bJ). The obedience requirement
31
is now
bI = reg(θ|ηI + bI ◦ γI),
1 = reg(θ|bT (η + b ◦ γ)).
Thus, this general problem interpolates between signaling, in which I = {1, . . . , k},
and scoring, in which J = {1, . . . , k}.
6.5 Correlated distortion ability
The covariance assumptions capture the intuition that distortion impedes the infor-
mativeness of the sender’s features. Without the covariance assumptions, the variance
cannot be decomposed into the uncertainty introduced by the distortion ability and
the information from the sender’s intrinsic levels. In the scoring benchmark, the
equilibrium still exists, but uniqueness is not guaranteed. Existence only relies on
the feature vector having nonsingular variance. I can prove that generically scor-
ing strictly improves upon signaling, but there is no easy expression for the generic
condition.
6.6 Further extensions
I discuss additional extensions in Appendix B.3. In particular, I allow for the sender’s
cost function to be nonseparable across the different dimensions of distortion and
for multi-dimensional decisions. I also allow the sender’s distortion activity to be
productive in the sense that it shifts the receiver’s bliss point. The common thread
of these extensions is that as long as the linear structure is preserved, the equilibria
can be characterized by a large cubic system. This system, however, is challenging to
analyze.
7 Conclusion
I show that in the presence of strategic distortion, the receiver-optimal scoring rule
outperforms full disclosure. There are natural directions for future work. To focus
on the weighting of different features, I study a static model. In a dynamic model,
I could analyze the relative weights on different features at different times. I also
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assume that the intermediary knows the distribution of the sender’s type and latent
characteristic. It would be interesting to try to estimate the moments of the distribu-
tion from observed behavior. This would be a first step towards applying the theory
to design more accurate scoring systems.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
This is implied by Lemma 2, which is stated and proved in Appendix B.4.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
This result is proved in the main text; see Section 3.3.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
I separate the existence and uniqueness proofs. The existence proof does not use
Assumption A or B.
Existence For this proof, drop Assumptions A and B. Generalize further by letting
the receiver’s bliss point be θ + vTd. The coefficient vector b is an equilibrium if and
only if b minimizes the function
z 7→ var
(
zT (η + b ◦ γ)− θ − vT (b ◦ γ)
)
.
Define a function g : Rk → Rk by setting g(b) equal to the unique minimizer of the
right side. I will show that g has a fixed point. For every b in Rk, comparing z = v
with z = g(b) gives
var(vTη − θ) ≥ var
(
g(b)T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ − vT (b ◦ γ)
)
≥ E[var
(
g(b)T (η + b ◦ γ)− θ − vT (b ◦ γ)|γ
)
]
= E[var(g(b)Tη − θ|γ)].
Expand the last term to get
g(b)T E[var(η|γ)]g(b)− 2g(b)T E[cov(η, θ|γ)] + E[var(θ|γ)].
Therefore, the image of the function g is included in the set
G = {z ∈ Rk : var(vTη − θ) ≥ zT E[var(η|γ)]z − 2zT E[cov(η, θ|γ)] + E[var(θ|γ)]}.
The matrix E[var(η|γ)] is a positive definite because it is a positive scalar multiple
of Σηη − ΣηγΣ
†
γγΣγη (Cambanis et al., 1981, Corollary 5). By assumption, Σηη −
ΣηγΣ
†
γγΣγη has full rank. Therefore, the set G is compact and convex.
18 Now restrict
the function g to the set G and apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
18Here are the details. Let λ be the smallest eigenvalue of E[var(η|γ)]. For z ∈ G, we have in
particular that var(vT η − θ) ≥ λ2‖z‖2 − 2‖z‖ ‖E[cov(η, θ|γ)]‖.
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Uniqueness For uniqueness, I relax the assumption A to read cov(γ, η) = 0 and
cov(γ, θ) ≤ 0. Define the function uR : R
k ×Rk → R by
uS(z, b) = var
(
zT (η + b ◦ γ)− θ
)
.
this function is convex in its first argument, so the first-order condition is necessary
and sufficient for optimality. Hence, there is a linear equilibrium with coefficient
vector b if and only if
0 = ∇1uS(b, b) = 2 var(η + b ◦ γ)b− 2 cov(η + b ◦ γ, θ).
I construct a potential function whose gradient coincides with this expression.
Define Φ: Rk → R by
Φ(z) = var
(
zT η + (1/2)(z ◦ z)Tγ − θ
)
. (A.1)
Since cov(η, γ) = 0, differentiating with respect to z gives
∇Φ(z) = 2 var(η)z + 2diag(z) var(γ)(z ◦ z)− 2 cov(η, θ)− 2 diag(z) cov(γ, θ)
= 2 var(η + z ◦ γ)z − 2 cov(η + z ◦ γ, θ).
Therefore, the linear equilibria are precisely the set of vectors b satisfying ∇Φ(b) = 0.
To complete the proof, I show that Φ is strictly convex. Convexity ensures that
minimizers and critical points are equivalent; strict convexity ensures that there is at
most one minimizer.19
To prove that Φ is convex, expand (A.1). Noting that cov(η, γ) = 0, and convert-
ing to Σ-notation for covariances, we have
Φ(z) = zTΣηηz + (1/2)(z ◦ z)
TΣγγ(z ◦ z)− (1/2)(z ◦ z)
TΣγθ − z
TΣηθ.
The first term is strictly convex. The quadratic term convex because −Σγθ is nonneg-
ative; and the last term is linear. The quartic term is convex because Σγγ is positive
semidefinite and componentwise nonnegative, as we now check. The gradient and
Hessian of this term are given by
2 diag(z)Σγγ(z ◦ z) and 4 diag(z)Σγγ diag(z) + 2 diag
(
Σγγ(z ◦ z)
)
.
Each term of the Hessian is positive semidefininite: the first matrix it is congruent to
Σγγ , and the second matrix is a diagonal matrix with nonnegative entries.
19It is possible for a strictly convex function to have no minimizers; consider the map z 7→
exp(z1 + · · ·+ zk). But I have independently proved existence. Here it suffices to prove that there
is at most one equilibrium.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Set t = s2. I prove that the receiver’s equilibrium loss is increasing in t. The receiver’s
loss is her posterior variance, which equals
bTΣηηb− 2b
TΣηθ + σ
2
θ + t(b ◦ b)
T Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b). (A.2)
Here the vector b depends on t, but I suppress the dependence to simplify the notation.
I use the implicit function theorem to compute the derivative b˙ of b with respect
to t. The equilibrium condition is
Σηηb− Σηθ + t diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b) = 0. (A.3)
The derivative of the left side with respect to t is diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b). The derivative of
the left side with respect to b is given by
D = Σηη + diag(tΣ¯γγ(b ◦ b)) + 2t diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b).
It can be checked that this matrix D is positive definite.20 By the implicit function
theorem,
b˙ = −D−1 diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b).
The total derivative of (A.2) with respect to t is[
2Σηηb− 2Σηθ + 4t(b ◦ b)
T Σ¯γγ diag(b)
]
b˙+ (b ◦ b)T Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b).
By (A.3), part of the term in brackets vanishes. Plugging in the expression for b˙ gives
− 2t(b ◦ b)T Σ¯γγ diag(b)D
−1 diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b) + (b ◦ b)
T Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b). (A.4)
We have
D  2t diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b).
The matrix D is invertible, but the matrix on the right is not necessarily invertible,
so we use the Moore–Penrose psuedoinverse. We have
D−1 
[
2t diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)
]†
.
Therefore,
2t(b ◦ b)T Σ¯γγ diag(b)D
−1 diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b)
≤ 2t(b ◦ b)T Σ¯γγ diag(b)
[
2t diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)
]†
diag(b)Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b)
20The matrix Σηη is positive definite and the next two matrices are positive semidefinite; in partic-
ular, Σ¯γγ is a nonnegative matrix, and hence the diagonal matrix diag(tΣ¯γγ(b ◦ b)) has nonnegative
entries and hence is positive semidefinite.
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= bT diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)
[
diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)
]†
diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)b
= bT diag(b)Σ¯γγ diag(b)b
= (b ◦ b)T Σ¯γγ(b ◦ b).
By (A.3), the proof is complete.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Clearly, the sender does not have a profitable deviation. Start with a scoring rule f
and an equilibrium (d, y). Define σR as the composition of y and f , as illustrated in
the first commutative diagram below. Filling in the diagram with the identity, shows
that the direct implementation induces the same decision rule.
Rk
S R
R
f
σR
y
y
id
Rk
S R
R
f
σR
y′
y
δ
The second diagram shows that any deviation δ by the receiver in this direct
implementation was attainable by a different deviation y′ in the original game, where
y′ is defined as the composition of δ with y.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Let b be a solution to to the scoring problem. By the Lagrange multiplier theorem,
there exists a multiplier λ¯ such that
∇f(b) = λ¯∇g(b).
But ∇g(b) = ∇f(b) + Σηθ. Therefore,
∇f(b) = λ¯∇f(b) + λ¯Σηθ.
Rearranging gives
0 = (λ¯− 1)
(
∇f(b) + λ¯/(λ¯− 1)Σηθ
)
.
This gives the same first-order condition as ∇f(b) = 0, except that Σηθ is scaled by
λ = 1− λ¯/(2λ¯− 2) =
λ¯− 2
2λ¯− 2
.
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To get the bound on λ, observe that the first-order condition gives
Σηηb+ 2diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b) = λΣηθ .
Multiplying by bT gives
bTΣηηb+ 2(b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)) = λb
TΣηθ,
Therefore,
λ =
bTΣηηb+ 2(b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)
bTΣηθ
.
But it follows that
1 =
bTΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)
bTΣηθ
≤ λ <
2bTΣηηb+ 2(b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)
bTΣηθ
= 2.
For each λ, the solution is unique because it minimizes a strictly convex function.
But it remains to prove that λ is unique. By the implicit function theorem, b(λ)TΣηθ
is strictly increasing in λ. But the scoring constraint then implies that the objective
is strictly increasing in λ, which is a contradiction.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 2
Let Ω denote the spaces of tuples (Σηθ,Σηη,Σγγ) such that Σηη and Σγγ are symmetric
and positive definite and Σγγ has strictly positive entries. The set Ω can viewed as
an open subset of Euclidean space of dimension
k + k(k + 1)/2 + k(k + 1)/2 = k(k + 2).
Endow Ω with the usual Lebesgue measure. Define the function F : Ω×Rk+1 → R2k
by
F (Σηθ,Σηη,Σγγ , b, λ) =
[
Σηθ − Σηηb− diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b)
λΣηθ − Σηηb− 2 diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b)
]
.
This function F is transverse to 0, as I verify below. By the transversality theorem
(Guillemin and Pollack, 2010, p. 68), for almost every ω ∈ Ω, the function Fω =
F (ω, ·) is transverse to 0. But each function Fω maps R
k+1 into R2k, so it can only
be transverse to 0 if it does not map any point to 0.
To see that F is transverse to 0, consider the submatrix of the Jacobian consisting
of the derivatives with respect to Σηθ and b. This 2k × 2k matrix is[
Ik −Σηη − diag(Σγγ(b ◦ b))− 2 diag(b)Σγγ diag(b)
λIk −Σηη − 2 diag(Σγγ(b ◦ b))− 4 diag(b)Σγγ diag(b)
]
.
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For every (Σηθ,Σηη,Σγγ) in Ω and (b, λ) in R
k+1, this matrix has full rank: the upper
left submatrix is the identity and hence has full rank; the bottom right submatrix is
negative definite and hence has full rank.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
If bscore = 0, then bsignal = 0, so in particular bsignal is a scalar multiple of β. Hereafter
we may assume bscore is nonzero.
By (6), the intermediary’s problem is
minimize bTΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)− 2b
TΣηθ + σ
2
θ
subject to bTΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b)− b
TΣηθ = 0.
The gradient of the constraint is
Σηηb+ 4diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b).
It can be checked that this gradient is nonzero as long as b is nonzero.21 By the La-
grange multiplier theorem, there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ such that the scoring
solution bscore satisfies
2Σηηb+ 4diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b)− 2Σηθ = λ [2Σηηb+ 4diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b)− Σηθ ] .
By (5), the signaling equilibrium condition is
Σηηb+ diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b) = Σηθ.
Plugging in this equation gives
2Σηθ − 2Σηηb = λ [3Σηθ − 2Σηηb] .
Rearranging gives
(2− 3λ)Σηθ = 2(1− λ)Σηηb,
Since Σηθ 6= 0, the right side cannot vanish, so λ 6= 1, and we conclude that
b =
3λ− 2
2λ− 2
β.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 6
Consider two values Σγγ and Σ
′
γγ with Σ
′
γγ  σγγ . Let bscore and b
′
score be the cor-
responding solutions. With parameter Σγγ , the intermediary can secure the same
21 Left multiplying by bT gives bTΣηηb + 4(b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b), which is positive, provided that b is
nonzero.
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payoff with the random scoring rule that adds noise t2 = (b′score)
T (Σ′γγ − Σγγ)b
′
score.
But noise is strictly suboptimal by Proposition 8, so the intermediary can do strictly
better.
A.10 Proof of Theorem 3
First I establish the following inequalities:
‖β‖44,γ > ‖bsignal‖
4
4,γ
{
≥ ‖bscore‖
4
4,γ,
> ‖bscreen‖
4
4,γ .
To compare β and bsignal, recall that they respectively minimize
var(bTη − θ) and var(bT η − θ) + (1/2)‖b‖44,γ.
To compare βsignal and bscore, recall that they respectively minimize the functions
var(bT η − θ) + (1/2)‖b‖44,γ and var(b
Tη − θ) + ‖b‖44,γ,
over the set of feasible scoring rules. In fact, bsignal is a global minimizer, so it in
particular it minimizes over this set.
Finally, to compare bsignal and bscreen, recall that they minimize the functions
var(bT η − θ) + (1/2)‖b‖44,γ and var(b
Tη − θ) + ‖b‖44,γ.
It remains to prove that ‖bscore‖
4
4,γ > ‖bscreen‖
4
4,γ . By Proposition 4, there exists λ
in [1, 2) such bscore satisfies the first-order condition
Σηηb+ 2diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b)− λΣηθ = 0. (A.5)
I apply the implicit function theorem in λ. If λ = 1, this condition gives the screening
solution. To compare the scoring and the screening solution, I continuously interpo-
late between scoring and screening, through the parameter λ, and I study the local
effect on the two components of the receiver’s losses. The derivative of this left side
with respect to λ is −Σηθ. The derivative of the left side with respect to b is given by
D = Σηη + 2diag(Σγγ(b ◦ b)) + 4 diag(b)Σγγ diag(b).
By the implicit function theorem, b is locally differentiable in λ and
b˙ = D−1Σηθ.
40
From (A.5), we have
λΣηθ − Σηηb = 2diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b).
Left multiplying by bT gives
λbTΣηθ − b
TΣηηb = 2‖b‖
4
γ,4.
Therefore, it suffices to prove that the left side is strictly increasing in λ. Differenti-
ating with respect to λ gives
bTΣηθ + λΣ
T
ηθ b˙− 2b
TΣηη b˙.
Plug in the expression for b˙ from the implicit function theorem to get
bTΣηθ + λΣ
T
ηθD
−1Σηθ − 2b
TΣηηD
−1Σηθ. (A.6)
To bound the last term, I use a simple inequality for quadratic forms. If A is positive
semidefinite, and x and y are vectors, then expanding (x − y)TA(x − y) shows that
2xTAy ≤ xTAx+ yTAy. Applying this here gives
2bTΣηηD
−1Σηθ = 2λ
−1bTΣηηD
−1(λΣηθ)
≤ λ−1
[
bTΣηηD
−1Σηηb+ (λΣηθ)
TD−1(λΣηθ)
]
= λ−1bTΣηηD
−1Σηηb+ λΣηθD
−1Σηθ.
Since D  Σηη, the right side is bounded above by
λ−1bTΣηηb+ λΣηθD
−1Σηθ.
Plugging this inequality into (A.6), the last term cancels and we get the lower bound
bTΣηθb− λ
−1bTΣηηb.
Rearrange this expression and use (A.5) to get
λ−1bT
(
λΣηθ − Σηηb
)
= λ−1(b ◦ b)TΣγγ(b ◦ b).
This final expression is strictly positive.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 7
Compare the first-order conditions in the three cases:
Σηθ − Σηηb = diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b),
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λΣηθ − Σηηb = 2diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b),
Σηθ − Σηηb = 2diag(b)Σγγ(b ◦ b),
where λ is the scalar in [1, 2).
Here I use the notation
σ2γ = (σ
2
γ,1, . . . , σ
2
γ,k), σ
2
ε = (σ
2
ε,1, . . . , σ
2
ε,k).
Similarly, let σγ and σε denote the vectors consisting of the standard deviations. In
the simple setting, we can express the covariance matrices as
Σηθ = 1, Σηη = 11
T + diag(σ2ε), Σγγ = diag(σ
2
γ).
Plugging these into the first-order conditions gives
1− 11T b− diag(σ2ε)b = 2diag(b) diag(σ
2
γ)(b ◦ b)
λ1− 11T b− diag(σ2ε)b = 2diag(b) diag(σ
2
γ)(b ◦ b)
1− 11T b− diag(σ2ε)b = diag(b) diag(σ
2
γ)(b ◦ b).
It follows that there is a scalar K, depending on the parameters and the commitment
regime such that signaling satisfies the equation
K = σ2ε,ibi + σ
2
γ,ib
3
i .
For scoring and screening,
K = σ2ε,ibi + 2σ
2
γ,ib
3
i .
To satisfy the full rank assumption we must have σ2ε nonzero so it follows that each
K is strictly positive. Moreover, Kscreen < Kscore, which proves the final result.
A.12 Proof of Proposition 8
I prove that if the scoring solution has noise, then Σγθ < 0. Substituting the constraint
into the intermediary’s problem, we get the equivalent problem
maximize cov
(
bTη + (b ◦ b)Tγ, θ
)
subject to var
(
bT η + (b ◦ b)Tγ
)
+ t2 = cov
(
bT η + (b ◦ b)Tγ, θ
)
.
Suppose for a contradiction that the maximum is achieved at (b¯, s¯), where s¯ > 0. By
adjusting s, it is possible to change b in any direction, so a necessary condition is that
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there is local maximum in the objective. Write out the objective as
g(b) = bTΣηθ + (b ◦ b)
TΣγθ.
The necessary conditions for a local maximum are
∇g(b) = Σηθ + 2b ◦ Σγθ = 0.
∇2g(b) = 2 diag(Σγθ)  0.
It follows that Σγθ ≤ 0. To rule out σγθ = 0, observe that if that case Σηθ = 0, then
the unique solution is (b, t) = 0.
A.13 Proof of Proposition 9
The intermediary’s problem is
minimize pi(1/2)(b ◦ b)Tµγ + (1− pi)
[
bTΣηηb− 2b
TΣηθ + (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ + t
2
]
subject to bTΣηθ = b
TΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b).
Substituting the constraint, we get an alternative program with the same set of max-
imizers:
minimize pi(1/2)(b ◦ b)Tµγ − (1− pi)b
TΣηθ
subject to bTΣηθ = b
TΣηηb+ (b ◦ b)
TΣγγ(b ◦ b) + t
2.
Consider the unconstrained problem. The objective is convex. The first-order condi-
tion gives
pi(b ◦ µg) = (1− pi)Σηθ.
Hence
bˆ = pi−1(1− pi)Σηθ ◦ µ
−1
γ ,
where µ−1γ is the componentwise reciprocal of µγ. As bˆ is scaled up, the term in
brackets is strictly increasing, as is the noise ratio
bˆTΣηη bˆ+ (bˆ ◦ bˆ)
TΣγγ(bˆ ◦ bˆ)− bˆ
TΣηθ
bTΣηθ
=
bˆTΣηη bˆ+ (bˆ ◦ bˆ)
TΣγγ(bˆ ◦ bˆ)
bTΣηθ
− 1.
B Additional results
B.1 Homogeneous intrinsic level
When distortion ability is homogeneous, there is a fully informative equilibrium
(Proposition 1). Here I consider the signaling equilibrium when the intrinsic type
is homogeneous. For this result, I drop Assumptions A and B. There is always a
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trivial equilibrium with b = 0.
Proposition 10 (Homogeneous intrinsic level)
Suppose Σγγ is positive definite. If the intrinsic type η is nonrandom, then the non-
trivial linear signaling equilibria are given as follows. For each subset J of {1, . . . , k}
with regJ(θ|γJ) > 0,
b−J = 0, bJ = reg
1/2(θ|γJ),
where the square root is evaluated componentwise.
Proof. It is immediate that these are equilibria. Even if the receiver observed γJ , he
would not have a deviation, but in these equilibria the receiver observes a garbling of
γJ because some components of γJ are censored.
For the converse, suppose there is a linear equilibrium b. Set J = supp b. The
equibrilibrium condition requires that b2j = regj(θ|γJ) for each j ∈ J , so this equilib-
rium takes the desired form.
B.2 Equilibrium stability
In the case where the equilibrium is unique, best-response dynamics will converge
towards the equilibrium. If one player uses a linear strategy, then the best response
of the other player is linear, so best responses stay within the class of linear strategies,
which can be represented by two vectors a and b. The linear strategies are represented
by
d(η, γ) = a ◦ γ, y(x) = b0 + b
Tγ,
Initially each player chooses a linear strategy, denoted a(0) and b(0). Then the agents
continuously adjust their strategies that that at each time t, the derivative a′(t) is in
the direction of the best response. The sender’s best response is to match the vector
used by the receiver, so
a˙ = b− a, b˙ = reg(θ|η + a ◦ γ)− b.
The intercept b0 is adjusted similarly, but this evolution is pinned down by the
dynamics of b.22
Theorem 4 (Dynamics)
Starting from any linear strategy profile, continuous best-response dynamics converge
to the unique linear equilibrium. Moreover, the rate of convergence is exponential.
Proof. There are two steps. First I construct a potential function, and then I apply
convergence results for zero-sum games.
22That is,
b˙0 = µθ − reg
T (θ|η + a ◦ γ)(µη + a ◦ µγ)− b0.
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Construct zero-sum potential I construct a potential function Ψ as follows. We
denote the linear strategies of the agents by a for the sender and b for the receiver.
Define Ψ: Rk ×Rk → R by
Ψ(a, b) = var
(
bT (η + a ◦ γ)− θ
)
− (1/2) var
(
(a ◦ a)Tγ − θ
)
.
I claim that the function Ψ is a zero-sum potential. The sender chooses the first
argument to maximize Ψ and the receiver chooses the second argument to minimize
Ψ. For the receiver, this is a cardinal potential function. For the sender, this is an
ordinal potential function, and it suffices to check that for all b ∈ Rk, we have
b ∈ argmax
a
Ψ(a, b).
To prove this, write
Ψ(a, b) = (a ◦ b)TΣγγ(a ◦ b)− (1/2)(a ◦ a)Σγγ(a ◦ a)
− (a ◦ b)TΣγθ + (1/2)(a ◦ a)
TΣγθ + h(b),
where the function h is defined to collect the terms that do not depend on a. Ex-
panding componentwise, we have
Ψ(a, b) =
∑
i,j
[aibiajbj − a
2
ia
2
j/2] cov(γi, γj)−
∑
i
[aibi − a
2
i /2] cov(γi, θ) + h(b).
For each i and j, we have cov(γi, γj) ≥ 0 and cov(γi, θ) ≤ 0. Hence, it suffices to
check that each term in brackets is maximized with a = b. For the second term this
is immediate. For the first, I check that
aibiajbj − a
2
i a
2
j/2 ≤ b
2
i b
2
j − b
2
i b
2
j/2 = b
2
i b
2
j/2,
which follows from the inequality (aiaj − bibj)
2 ≥ 0. This shows that the receiver’s
best response minimizes this function. This is the unique best response if for each i,
at least one of the terms cov(γi, θ) or one entry of cov(γi, γ) is strictly positive. But
we do not need this for the result.
Apply results from zero-sum dynamics As long as the sender’s best response is
contained in the best response for this zero-sum potential function, the result holds.
In fact, we get a stronger result because the dynamics are more permissive. We apply
the convergence result of Barron et al. (2010), which generalizes Hofbauer and Sorin
(2006). To apply this theorem, it suffices to check that the correspondences BRS and
BRR, defined by
BRS(b) = argmax
a′
Ψ(a′, b), and BRR(a) = argmax
b′
Ψ(a, b′).
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are convex valued and uppersemicontinuous. Upper semicontinuity is immediate from
Berge’s theorem. The receiver’s best-response correspondence is singleton-valued and
hence convex-valued. For the sender, notice that
BRS(b) = {bJ} ×R−J ,
where J is the support described above. The theorem requires that we work in a
convex set, but this is without loss becuause of the uniform bound on the sender’s
best response established above.
B.3 Further extensions
Distortion Suppose that negative distortion is free for features in a subset J of
{1, . . . k}. For features in {1, . . . , k}\J , negative distortion is still costly. We analyze
the model as follows. First, analyze the model as before. Each equilibrium with
coefficient vector b remains an equilibrium in the alternative model if and only if
bJ ≥ 0. But this does not necessarily exhaust the set of equilibria. For each subset
J ′ of J , consider the truncated model with dimensions in J ′ removed. Solve for the
resulting equilibria and check whether bJ\J ′ is nonnegative. If so, appending bJ ′ = 0
gives an equilibrium.23
Noisy features I can add noisy features as long as the elliptical distribution is
preserved.
Nonseparable costs To generalize to nonseparable cost functions, suppose that
the sender’s gaming ability is represented not by a random k-vector γ but rather by
a random k × k matrix Γ. Now suppose that the vector
(θ, η, vech(Γ)) ∈ R1+k+k(k+1)/2
is jointly elliptically distributed. Moreover, assume that Γ is almost surely symmetric
and positive semidefinite. The sender’s utility becomes eTΓ†e. This reduces to the
baseline model with Γ = diag(γ). For non-diagonal matrices, it becomes more difficult
to simultaneously satisfy the elliptical assumptions and the nonnegative definiteness
assumptions, but one particular case is if Γ is diagonally dominant: γii >
∑
j 6=i |γij|
for each i. If the diagonal entries of γ are bounded away from 0, then we can always
choose a sufficiently small off-diagonal elements to satisfy this condition. Preferences
23Indeed, the same model immediately permits lower dimensional distortion, without any change.
Suppose distortion has dimension ℓ, with ℓ < k, and that the feature vector takes the above form
with B˜ a k× ℓ matrix with linearly independent columns. Add additional columns to extend B˜ to a
k × k matrix, and take γi = 0 for i = ℓ+ 1, . . . , k. Then apply the inverse transformation as before.
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are given by
uS = y − (1/2)d
TΓ†d, uR = −(y − θ − v
Td)2.
If the receiver uses a strategy with coefficient vector b, the sender chooses e ∈ Rk to
maximize
bT (η + d)− (1/2)dTΓ†d.
This is a concave maximization. The first-order condition is
0 = b− Γ†d,
so d = Γb. The solution to the first-order condition is not unique, but this is the
unique solution with finite distortion cost. The equilibrium condition becomes
var(η + Γb)b = cov(η + Γb, θ + vTΓb).
Multi-dimensional decisions We can also extend to the model to allow for mul-
tidimensional decisions. The sender’s latent type θ is an m-vector, and the receiver
takes a decision y ∈ Rm. Decisions are normalized so that each contributes equally to
the sender’s utility. The productivity of distortion is now an k×m matrix V , and the
receiver’s utility is weighted by a symmetric positive semidefinite m × m weighting
matrix. Preferences are given by
uS =
m∑
j=1
yj − (1/2)
k∑
i=1
d2i /γi, uR = −(y − θ − V
Td)TW (y − θ − V Td),
Now a linear decision function is parametrized by a k×m coefficient matrix B. Given
such a strategy, the sender chooses e ∈ Rk to maximize
1TBT (η + d)− (1/2)
k∑
j=1
d2j/γj,
where 1 is the m-vector of ones. The first-order condition gives
e = B1 ◦ γ,
so the equilibrium condition on the k×m matrix b becomes the k×m matrix equation
var(η +B1 ◦ γ)B = cov
(
η +B1 ◦ γ, θ + vT (B1 ◦ γ)
)
.
Therefore, there are km equilibrium constraints, and there will be m constraints in
the intermediary’s problem. Relative to the baseline model, the number of constraints
is multiplied by m, the number of dimensions of the decision.
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B.4 Elliptical distributions
Multivariate elliptical distributions generalize the multivariate Gaussian distribution.
This family retains the ellipsoidal symmetry of the multivariate Gaussian but allows
for more flexible tail behavior. For a detailed discussion of symmetric multivariate dis-
tributions and the properties of elliptical distributions, see the paper Cambanis et al.
(1981) or the monograph Fang et al. (1989). Deimen and Szalay (2019) work with a
specific subfamily of univariate elliptical distributions with the further property that
the tail conditional distributions are linear.
Elliptical distributions were first introduced into economics by Owen and Rabinovitch
(1983) and Chamberlain (1983).24
In fact, we get the following useful characterization result, which shows that the
elliptical family is the most general.
Throughout, we work with generalized inverses
For full generality, we need to use pseudo inverses. Given a diagonal matrix Σ, the
pseudoinverse Σ+ is formed by reciprocating the nonzero diagonal matrix and leaving
zeros unchanged. Similarly for positive α, set Σ−α = (Σ+)α. Any symmetric matrix
A can be expressed as V ΣV T for some diagonal matrix Σ. Let A+ denote V Σ+V and
A−α denote V Σ−αV T . It can be shown that this notation is well-defined.
Lemma 2 (Elliptical characterization)
Fix an n-vector a positive semidefinite n × n matrix Σ. For an integrable random
n-vector X, the following are equivalent.
1. X =d µ+ Σ
1/2Z for some integrable spherical random variable Z.
2. For each n×m matrix A and n× p matrix B, we have
E[ATX|BTX ] = ATµ+ ATΣB(BTΣB)−1(X − µ).
3. For all n-vectors a and b, we have
E[aTX|bTX ] = aTµ+ aTΣb(bTΣb)−1(X − µ).
4. For all n-vectors a and b satisfying aTΣb = 0, we have
E[aTX|bTX ] = aTµ.
Proof. Recall that (1) is the standard definition of an integrable elliptical distribution,
24Elliptical distributions have a long history: Frankel and Kartik (2019a) cites Gesche (2017),
who cites an earlier version of Deimen and Szalay (2019), who in turn cites Mailath and No¨ldeke
(2008). They cite the finance paper of Foster and Viswanathan (1993), which finally cites
Owen and Rabinovitch (1983) and Chamberlain (1983). Independently, Li et al. (1987) first ob-
serve the advantage of weakening joint normality assumptions to the linear conditional expectation
property. In their Cournot model, each player makes inferences based on an exogenous signal, so
they do not need the stronger elliptical assumption, which requires linear conditional expectations
conditional on linear combinations of signals.
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and is known to imply (2) (Cambanis et al., 1981). It is immediate that (2) implies
(3), which in turn implies (4). So the key step is showing that (4) implies (1). From
the characterization, it suffices to show that Σ−1/2(X − µ) is spherical. Suppose aˆ
and bˆ are orthogonal. Using the spherical characterization of Eaton (1986), It suffices
to show that the following expectation vanishes:
E
[
aˆTΣ−1/2(X − µ) | bˆTΣ−1/2(X − µ)
]
= E
[
aˆTΣ−1/2X | bˆTΣ−1/2X
]
− aˆTΣ−1/2µ,
but this follows immediately by putting a = Σ−1/2aˆ and b = Σ−1/2bˆ.
The observation about linearity of regression was made in Nimmo-Smith (1979)
and strengthened in Hardin (1982). A slightly different characterization involving
only orthogonal vectors was given by Eaton (1986).
B.5 Single-feature solution
Suppose that there is only one feature, i.e., k = 1. In this case, I drop all subscripts. It
is convenient to denote the regression coefficients with the symbol β. The equilibrium
condition is univariate cubic expression, which can be solved explicitly with Cardano’s
formula. The condition is
var(η + bγ)b = cov(η + bγ, θ + vbγ),
where every symbol is now a scalar. Expanding using the notation σ to indicate
covariances yields(
σ2η + 2bσηγ + b
2σ2γ
)
b = σθη + vbσηγ + bσθγ + vb
2σ2γ .
If σ2γ = 0, we have b = σθη/σ
2
η. Otherwise, we can divide through by σ
2
γ and rearrange
to get the cubic equation
0 = b3 +
(
2σηγ/σ
2
γ − v
)
b2 +
(
σ2η/σ
2
γ − vσηγ/σ
2
γ − σθγ/σ
2
γ
)
b− σθη/σ
2
γ.
Writing βθ|γ for the regression coefficient when regressing θ on γ, and similarly for
other variables, and letting ζ be the quotient σ2η/σ
2
η , we get
0 = b3 +
(
2βη|γ − v
)
b2 +
(
ζ − vβη|γ − βθ|γ
)
b− βζ.
The solution is determined by four parameters rather than the initial six. This re-
flects two normalizations: (i) scaling all (θ, η, γ, e, y) by a positive constant, and (ii)
normalizing the component of θ orgothogonal to (η, γ) to zero. The full solution is
quite involved, but it is instructive to examine the discriminant. There is a unique
root if and only if (i) ∆ < 0 or (ii) ∆ = 0 and ∆0 = 0, where ∆ and ∆0 are defined
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as follows:
∆ = −18(2βη|γ − v)(λ− vβη|γ − βθ|γ)βλ+ 4(2βη|γ − v)
3βλ
+ (2βη|γ − v)
2(λ− vβη|γ − βθ|γ)
2 − 4(λ− vβη|γ − βθ|γ)
3 − 27β2λ2,
and
∆0 = (2βη|γ − v)
2 − 3(λ− vβη|γ − βθ|γ).
In the pure gaming case, we have v = 0, and βη|γ = βθ|γ = 0. If σ
2
γ = 0, we know
the solution is unique. Otherwise, the discriminant becomes
∆ = −4λ3 − 27β2λ2,
which is strictly negative. This is an alternative proof of our general result in the
special case. Of course we have a sharper characterization in this case.
Unfortunately, the cubic equation is quite complicated. In the special case where
η and γ are uncorrelated and v = 0, the quadratic term vanishes, and we have an
explicit solution:
0 = b3 + (ζ − βθ|γ)b− βζ.
As long as ζ ≥ βθ|γ, the function on the right side is strictly increasing, so the solution
is unique.
B.6 Equilibrium nonuniqueness examples
I begin with two examples illustrating the at linear equilibria need not be unique.
Example 4 (Non-uniqueness, single feature). There is a single feature so k = 1. For
simplicity take v = 0 and σηγ = 0. In this case, the equilibrium condition becomes
b =
σθη + bσθγ
σ2η + b
2σ2γ
. (B.1)
At b = 0, the right side equals β = σθη/σ
2
η and has slope σθγ/σ
2
η. The right side
converges to 0 as the magnitude of b becomes large.
For this example, take
σ2η = σ
2
γ = 1, σθη = 0.2, σθγ = 2.
Thus, the gaming ability γ is much more informative than the intrinsic level η about
he characteristic θ. The two sides of (B.1), with these parameter values, are plotted on
the left side of Figure 9. There are three equilibria. Start at b = 0. Moving the right,
the slope of the receiver’s best response increases but is eventually attenuated by the
variance of the feature. We get an equilibrium at b = 1.09. Moving to the left, the
best response decreases past 0 and yields the equilibrium at b = −0.21. Continuing to
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Figure 9. Multiple equilibria with a single feature
the left, the larger gaming ability becomes more dominant, yielding the equilibrium at
b = −0.88. This equilibrium is smaller in magnitude than the increasing equilibrium
because the contributions of the gaming ability and the intrinsic level go in opposite
directions.
The right panel of Figure 9 considers the same parameter values except the sign
of σθη is flipped to −0.2. The signs of the equilibria flip as well, so the equilibria are
at 0.88, 0.21, and −1.09.
Finally, consider the welfare for the players across equilibria. The expected deci-
sion is the same across equilibria, so the sender’s utility is determined by the distortion
cost, which is increasing in the magnitude of b. The receiver’s utility is determined
by the magnitude of the correlation coefficient
corr(θ, η + bγ) =
σθη + bσθγ
σθ
√
σ2η + b
2σ2γ
.
At each equilibrium, this expression reduces to b(σ2η + b
2σ2γ)/σθ. Thus, across these
three equilibria, the receiver’s utility is strictly increasing in the magnitude of b.
With multiple features, there is a further form of nonuniqueness that can arise
when the features are correlated.
Example 5 (Non-uniqueness, multiple features). Let k = 2. For simplicity, set v = 0
and cov(η, γ) = 0. The nonzero parameters are as follows. The variances are given
by
var(η) = var(γ) =
[
1 0.5
0.5 1
]
.
The covariances are as follows:
cov(η1, θ) = cov(γ1, θ) = 0.4, cov(η1, θ) = 0.2, cov(γ1, θ) = 1.2.
On the first dimension, the intrinsic level and gaming ability are equally informative
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about θ. On the second dimension, the gaming ability is much more informative. If
the first feature were the only feature, then there would be a unique equilibrium with
with coefficient 0.48. If the second feature were the only feature, then there would
be a unique equilibrium with coefficient 0.70. If the dimensions were uncorrelated,
then the unique equilibrium would be b = (0.48, 0.70). But the covariance changes
the equilibrium structure. Now the equilibria are
b = (0.60,−0.48), b = (0.09, 0.66), b = (0.42, 0.13).
Compared to the single-dimensional equilibria, in the equilibria in which both coeffi-
cients are positive, the coefficients are attenuated by the positive covariance between
the dimensions.
B.7 Convexity and norms
If a function q : Rn → R is quasiconvex and absolutely homogeneous, then it is a
semi-norm.25 The proof is essentially the same as the proof that the Minkowski
functional is a semi-norm. Fix a and b in Rn, and let α = ‖a‖ and β = ‖b‖. We have
q
(
a + b
α + β
)
= q
(
α
α + β
·
a
α
+
β
α + β
·
b
β
)
≤ 1,
where the last line uses the quasiconvexity of q for the level set [q ≤ 1]. By absolute
homogeneity, it follows that
q(a+ b) ≤ α + β,
which is the desired subaditivity.
B.8 Measurability
The score set S is endowed with a σ-algebra S. The sender’s scoring rule f is a Markov
transition from Rk to S, where Rk is endowed with the usual Borel σ-algebra. That
is, f is a function from Rk × S → [0, 1] such that
(i) For each x ∈ Rk, the map A 7→ f(x,A) is a probability measure on S.
(ii) For each A ∈ S, the map x 7→ f(x,A) is measurable.
Behavioral strategies and decision rules are Markov transitions as well.
Markov transitions can be composed in the natural way. Let (X,X ), (Y,Y), and
(Z,Z) be measurable spaces. Given Markov transitions g from (X,X ) to (Y,Y) and
h from (Y,Y) to (Z,Z), the composition gh is the Markov transition from (X,X ) to
25A function q : Rk → R is absolutely homogenenous if q(tx) = |t|q(x) for all x ∈ Rk and t ∈ R.
A function q : Rk → R is a seminorm if it is nonnegative, absolutely homogeneous, and subadditive
(i.e., satisfies the triangle inequality).
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(Z,Z) defined by
(gh)(x, C) =
∫
Y
g(x, dy)h(y, C),
for all x ∈ X and C ∈ Z. In this integral, the function y 7→ h(y, C) is integrated over
Y against the measure g(x, ·). Likewise, the composition of a measure m in (X,X )
and a Markov transition g from (X,X ) to (Y,Y), the composition mg is the measure
on (Y,Y) defined by
(mg)(B) =
∫
Y
m(dy)g(y, B),
for all B ∈ Y . In this integral, the function y 7→ g(y, B) is integrated against the
measure m.
In the main text, I abuse notation by writign f(x) to denote a random variable
with measures f(x, ·). Similarly, when I write σS(η, γ) to denote the sender’s distor-
tion, viewed as a random variable. Formally, the distribution is the composition of
the law of (η, γ) and the Markov transition σS. The other compositions are defined
similarly.
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